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Abstract
Fifty-eight percent of the workers enrolled in the Illinois Claimant 
Bonus experiment were eligible for 38 weeks of Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
benefits--26 weeks of state-regular benefits plus 12 weeks of Federal 
Supplemental Compensation (FSC). The other 42 percent were eligible for 
only 26 weeks of state-regular UI benefits. We find that the Claimant Bonus 
treatment--an offer of $500 in cash for rapid reemployment--reduced the 
duration of insured unemployment by about 1.8 weeks for workers who were 
eligible for 38 weeks of UI benefits, but by only about 0.75 week for the 
workers who were eligible for 26 weeks of UI. We specify a search/matching 
model for each of the two groups (FSC-eligible and -ineligible) and find 
that (a) the model predicts a far larger bonus impact for workers eligible 
for 38 weeks of benefits than for those eligible for 26 weeks, and (b) the 
model's quantitative predictions cannot be rejected by the data.
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The basic result of the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment was striking 
and strong: A $500 cash bonus offered to insured unemployed workers for 
gaining reemployment within 11 weeks of filing for Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) benefits reduced the duration of insured unemployment by over 1 week on 
average (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987). Although apparently consistent with 
the results of the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration Project (Corson, 
Dunstan, Decker, and Gordon 1989), the Illinois Claimant Bonus effect is 
"too strong" in two senses: First, at least three well-executed 
investigations have been unable to explain the result using various economic 
models of worker behavior (Meyer 1988; Levine 1988, 1989). And second, the 
Washington Reemployment Bonus experiment (Spiegelman, O'Leary, and Kline 
1990) seems to have obtained significantly smaller bonus impacts than were 
observed in the Illinois experiment.
In this paper, we offer a possible explanation of the large effect of 
the Illinois Claimant Bonus. In section I, we show that over half of the 
workers enrolled in the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment were eligible for 
a total of 38 weeks of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits--26 weeks of 
state-regular benefits plus 12 weeks of Federal Supplemental Compensation 
(FSC). The other workers were eligible for just 26 weeks of state-regular 
benefits. We find that the Claimant Bonus effect was much larger for the 
FSC-eligible workers than for the workers who were eligible for only state-
regular benefits. In section II, we develop a search/matching model that is 
tailored to the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment, and show that the 
predicted effect of the Claimant Bonus is much greater for workers eligible 
for 38 weeks of UI than for workers eligible for just 26 weeks. Moreover, 
we find that the quantitative implications of the model cannot be rejected 
by the experiment's outcomes.
I. Effects of the Illinois Claimant Bonus under Different 
Potential Benefit Durations
Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) was a temporary extended UI 
benefit program that existed between 1982 and 1985 (Corson, Grossman, and 
Nicholson 1986). In Illinois, FSC entitled most UI beneficiaries to 12 
weeks of extended benefits in addition to their 26 weeks of state regular 
benefits. Because FSC expired about halfway into the enrollment period of 
the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment, we have a natural experiment 
embedded in the controlled Claimant Bonus experiment that was implemented by 
the Illinois Department of Employment Security and the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute. That is, because of FSC's expiration, some of the workers who 
were eligible to participate in the experiment had a potential benefit 
duration of 38 weeks (26 weeks of state-regular benefits plus 12 weeks of 
FSC), whereas others had potential benefit duration of just 26 weeks. We 
exploit the consequences of that natural experiment in this section.
Table 1 displays the number of workers enrolled in the Illinois 
Claimant Bonus experimental and control groups, broken down by FSC 
eligibility. The monetary eligibility requirements for FSC were more
stringent than for state regular benefits; hence, not all claimants whose 
work histories were sufficient to make them eligible for state regular 
benefits were also eligible for FSC. We have excluded from our sample of 
FSC-ineligibles workers who would have been ineligible for FSC even if they 
had filed their claim before FSC expired: that is, all claimants whose work 
histories would have made them ineligible for FSC are excluded from our
o
sample. As will be seen below (Table 2), this makes FSC-eligibles and 
ineligibles reasonably comparable without additional controls. Differences 
between the FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles we examine should result only 
from the fact that the eligibles filed before the FSC cutoff date.
The bottom row of Table 1 shows that 57 percent of the control group 
(2337 out of 3706) and nearly 60 percent of the Claimant Experiment group 
(2337 out of 3926) were eligible for FSC. Although these percentages are 
similar, the difference between them (nearly 3 percentage points) has a p- 
value of 1.7 percent, suggesting that a higher percentage of experimentals 
than controls were eligible for FSC. In view of the design and operations 
of the experiment, it is unclear why this should be the case.
Table 1 also shows the program participation of FSC-eligibles (Panel A) 
and -ineligibles (Panel B). FSC-eligibles were more likely to participate 
in and use the Claimant Experiment than were FSC-ineligibles. Whereas 20 
percent of FSC-eligibles submitted a Notice of Hire and 16 percent actually 
received a bonus, only 15 percent of the FSC-ineligibles submitted a Notice 
of Hire and 12 percent received a bonus. (Both of these differences between 
FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles have p-values of less than 1 percent.) This 
is the first piece of evidence suggesting that the Claimant Bonus had a 
greater impact on workers with longer benefit entitlement.
Our goal is to estimate the impact of the bonus offer and of 
FSC-eligibility on the duration of unemployment. Since workers were 
randomly assigned to the Claimant Bonus treatment, and since eligibility for 
FSC depends in our sample only on when a worker filed for benefits (before 
or after expiration of the FSC program), it may be reasonable to draw 
inferences from unadjusted pairwise comparisons between various subgroups.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of four subsamples of 
experimental enrollees: FSC-eligible controls, FSC-eligible experimentals, 
FSC-ineligible controls, FSC-ineligible experimentals. Comparing the FSC- 
eligible controls with the FSC-eligible experimentals, it seems that a 
higher proportion of experimentals were white, but there "are no other 
observable differences between controls and experimentals that have p-values 
as high as 5 percent. Comparison of FSC-Ineligible controls and 
experimentals suggests that a higher proportion of controls were women and 
filed for benefits in the Chicago area. Otherwise, these controls and 
experimentals are observationally quite similar. Finally, comparison of 
FSC-eligible controls with FSC-ineligible controls suggests that these two 
groups are quite similar, with the only difference being that the FSC- 
eligible controls were slightly older.
Although there are some observable differences among the four 
subsamples shown in Table 2, there is some support for the claim that the 
newly unemployed workers whose characteristics are summarized in the table 
were randomly distributed across the four groups. Accordingly, in section 
I.A below, we present unadjusted pairwise comparisons between groups, 
without additional controls. Although we believe that these unadjusted 
comparisons are worth presenting, the observable differences between the
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groups suggest the need for comparisons that do control for observable 
characteristics. Such adjusted comparisons are presented in section I.E.
A. Unadjusted Experimental Comparisons
1. Basic Results. Table 3 displays means (and differences of means) 
of a variety of program variables for each of the four groups. Consider the 
differences between the experimental and control groups, for FSC-eligibles 
(column 3) and FSC-ineligibles (column 6). There are three main points to 
be inferred from these figures. First, workers assigned to the Claimant 
Experiment who were eligible for FSC received $223 less in state regular UI 
benefits than did controls over the full benefit year (the p-value of this 
difference is far less than 1 percent) , but the experimentals who were 
ineligible for FSC received only $94 less, and this latter difference has a 
p-value of nearly 11 percent (see row 3, columns 3 and 6). That is, 
although the bonus offer resulted in a large drop in benefits received by 
FSC-eligibles, the evidence is at best weak that the bonus reduced the 
benefits paid to FSC-ineligibles.
Second, as can be seen in Table 3, row 6, workers in the Claimant 
Experiment who were eligible for FSC experienced nearly 1.8 fewer weeks of 
insured unemployment than did controls over the full benefit year (the p- 
value of this difference is far less than 1 percent). But experimentals who 
were _ineligible for FSC experienced only 0.7 fewer weeks of insured 
unemployment (the p-value of this difference is 3.5 percent).
Third, the contrast between FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles in their 
response to the Claimant Experiment appears again in the proportion of
claimants who exhausted their benefits (Table 3, row 7). Whereas FSC- 
eligible experimentals were less likely than controls to exhaust their 
benefits (by 5 percentage points, with a p-value far less than 1 percent), 
there is little evidence that FSC-rneligible experimentals were less likely 
to exhaust their benefits.
2. Unadjusted Reemployment Hazards. The data we are using are unusual 
in allowing us to construct an accurate measure of when a UI recipient
o
became reemployed. In Tables 4 and 5, we present unadjusted estimates of 
the conditional probability of reemployment--or discrete reemployment 
hazards  for each of the four groups. These hazards, which are based on the 
well-known Kaplan-Meier estimator, are descriptive in that they do not 
adjust for observable differences among workers in the probability of 
reemployment.
Because UI claimants in Illinois are certified for two weeks of 
benefits at a time, we measure time in two-week intervals starting from the 
time the initial claim was filed. We compute the unadjusted reemployment 
hazards in Tables 4 and 5 by dividing the number of workers who became 
reemployed during two-week period t by the number of workers who were 
unemployed at the beginning of period t. This latter group--the so-called 
risk set, or the number of workers "at risk" of reemployment--is shown in 
the columns labelled Risk set, and the unadjusted reemployment probability 
is shown in the columns labelled Hazard.
In constructing our reemployment variable we have assumed that all 
workers were unemployed for at least one week (the waiting week). Also, 
workers who gained reemployment during the first week during which UI could 
be collected are coded as reemployed during weeks 2 and 3. Hence, the
reemployment hazard for FSC-eligible controls in the first period (weeks 0 
and 1) is undefined, and 2,106 FSC-eligible controls were in the risk set at 
the beginning of the second period (see Table 4). Since 192 of these 
workers were reemployed by the end of this second period (weeks 2 and 3), 
the reemployment hazard for this period is 0.0912. Other reemployment 
hazards are computed similarly. Note that the risk set in period t+1 does 
not in general equal the risk set in period t minus the number of workers 
who gained reemployment. For example, the number of controls in the risk 
set at the beginning of weeks 4 and 5 (1,910) is 4 less than 2,106 minus 
192. This occurs because 4 workers left the labor force (that is, stopped 
searching for work and collecting UI benefits) during weeks 2 and 3.
Table 4 displays unadjusted reemployment hazards for FSC-eligible 
workers (both controls and experimentals). The general time-pattern of the 
hazards is similar for the two groups: Both hazard functions have an early 
spike, then fall gradually to a flat segment with hazards in the 
neighborhood of 0.03. There is a spike when state-regular benefits are 
exhausted, a return to a relatively low hazards during receipt of FSC, and 
finally a large spike at the time of benefit exhaustion. Note that there 
are noticeable upturns in the hazards just preceding the exhaustion of both 
state-regular benefits and FSC.
Although the hazards for the FSC-eligible control and experimental 
groups are similar in a general way, closer comparison of the two hazard 
functions shows some differences. In five of the first six periods (that 
is, the periods during which workers assigned to the experimental group 
could receive a $500 bonus by gaining reemployment) the experimental 
reemployment hazard exceeds the control hazard. (In the four of these
cases, the p-value of the difference is less than 10 percent, and in three 
cases the p-value is less than 5 percent. In the case in which the control 
group hazard exceeds the experimental hazard, the p-value is over 70 
percent.) After the bonus qualification period, the control and 
experimental hazards are very similar, except in the period prior to benefit 
exhaustion, when the control hazard exceeds the experimental hazard (the 
difference between 0.043 and 0.023 has a p-value of 6 percent).
Table 5 gives unadjusted reemployment hazards for FSC-ineligible 
workers. Again, the general time-pattern of the hazards is similar for the 
two groups, with both hazards showing an early spike followed by a flat 
segment (with hazards around 0.04), an upturn just before benefit
exhaustion, and a large spike at the point of benefit exhaustion. But there
/ 
are also differences between the FSC-ineligible control and experimental
groups. In three of the first six periods, the experimental reemployment 
hazard exceeds the control hazard. (In the two of these periods, the p- 
value is 5 percent or less. In none of the three periods in which the 
control group hazard exceeds the experimental hazard is the p-value less 
than 50 percent.) After the bonus qualification period, the control and 
experimental hazards are similar, except in weeks 22-23, when the control 
hazard exceeds the experimental hazard (the difference has a p-value of 5 
percent).
Finally, both Tables 4 and 5 show the expected duration of unemployment 
that is implied by each of the four unadjusted hazard functions. Table 4 
shows that the expected duration for FSC-eligible controls was 25.8 weeks, 
and for FSC-eligible experimentals was 24.1 weeks. These estimated expected 
durations of unemployment are both about 4 weeks greater than the directly
observed durations of insured unemployment shown in Table 3, row 6. The 
difference between the control and experimental expected durations, nearly 
1.8 weeks, is very close to the difference between the control and 
experimental insured unemployment durations.
Similarly, Table 5 shows that the expected duration of unemployment for 
FSC-ineligible controls was 22.4 weeks, and for FSC-ineligible experimentals 
was 21.6 weeks. The difference, nearly 0.9 weeks, again accords well with 
directly observed experimental effect on duration of insured unemployment 
(0.7 weeks--see Table 3, row 6, column 6).
To summarize, the unadjusted estimates of the bonus impact suggest that 
FSC-eligible workers responded more strongly to the bonus^ than did FSC- 
ineligible workers. We defer to section III a fuller discussion of the 
estimated differences between FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles in their 
response to the Claimant Bonus.
B. Adjusted Comparisons
The observable differences in characteristics among the four groups 
that we are analyzing suggest the possible importance of adjusting for 
those differences. In this section, we present the results of two adjusted 
comparisons.
1. Linear Model of Insured Unemployment Duration. We first estimate a 
linear model of the number of weeks of insured unemployment experienced by a 
worker during the full benefit year. Denoting the duration of insured 
unemployment (in weeks) by DIU, a vector of control variables by x^^, . . . ,
XK , and assignment to the Claimant Bonus experimental group by E, this model
can be written:
(1.1) DIU = a0 4- a. l yi l + . . . + aKxK + ak+1 E + u,
where u is assumed to be a normally distributed disturbance term. The
pioneering studies of the impact of UI on unemployment duration took
essentially this approach (Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 1976; Holen 1977).
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 display estimates of such a model applied to 
FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles. Included in the model are controls for 
gender, age, ethnicity, the number of employers for whom the claimant worked 
in the base period, base period earnings, the number of referrals received 
by the claimant from the Job Service, whether a dependents' allowance was 
received, the weekly UI benefit amount, and the labor market in which the 
claimant was searching for work.
The adjusted estimates of the Claimant Bonus's effects on insured 
unemployment (Table 6, columns 1 and 2) are in keeping with the unadjusted 
estimates discussed above (Table 3). The coefficient of the Claimant Bonus 
treatment variable suggests that the bonus offer reduced the number of weeks 
of insured unemployment by about 1.7 weeks for FSC-eligibles, and by close 
to 0.7 week for FSC-ineligibles. Thus, introducing controls in a linear OLS 
framework suggests that the unadjusted comparisons of insured unemployment 
discussed in section l.A are unbiased.
2. Discrete-Time Reemployment Hazard Model. A limitation of the 
unadjusted reemployment probabilities displayed in Tables 4 and 5 is that 
they fail to control for observable heterogeneity in the sample of workers 
analyzed. As an alternative, suppose that the reemployment hazard in period 
t following the initial claim for UI (mt ) depends on the same control
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variables (X I ,...,XK ) that were included in the linear model (these do not
vary over time), the season in which a worker is searching (s, which does
vary over time) and the elapsed time since the worker filed his or her
initial UI claim (t):
(1.2) mt = mt (x1 ,..., XK , s, t).
This contrasts with the unadjusted reemployment hazards of Tables 4 and 5,
which depend only on t.
We specify equation (1.2) as a discrete-time hazard model similar to 
those estimated by Nickell (1979), Ham and Rea (1987), and Steinberg and 
Monforte (1987). Specifically, we assume the existence of an underlying
 A-
indicator variable, mti , for worker i in time period t following his or her 
initial claim, defined by:
/ 1 Q \ " __ /-w -1_ <-v v _1_ -J- sv -v • /} • i f\ •
Tl t l +     + ^1 5^-15 + uti'
where the a, /?, and 7 are coefficients to be estimated, s l through SA are 
dummy variables specifying the season, t x through t15 are dummy variables 
specifying time since the initial claim, and uti is a disturbance term 
(assumed to have the standard normal distribution and to be independent of 
other uti ). We do not observe mti ; rather, we observe binary realizations 
of mti : 1 if mti > 0, zero otherwise.
Censoring is a problem that arises invariably with data of this kind. 
Although we observe 60 percent of the workers in our sample gaining 
reemployment, the other 40 percent either dropped out of the labor force or 
gained reemployment after the data available to us were collected. We 
observe a censored or incomplete spell of joblessness for these latter 
workers. Suppose there are I completed spells of joblessness in the sample
11
(indexed by i), and denote the probability of a completed spell of 
joblessness as gi (x11 ,..., xKi , s x , t i ). Further, suppose there are J 
censored spells of joblessness in the sample (indexed by j), and denote the 
probability of a censored spell of joblessness as [1 - G^XJJ ,..., xKj , 
s ' *- )J   ^e can tnen write the likelihood function for our sample as.
i j
(1.4) £ = E gi( Xli , .... xKi , s if tj n [1 - GjCXu ,..., xKj , Sj , t j ) ] .
1=1 j=i
Given our assumptions about the functional form and disturbance term in 
(1.3), this likelihood function can be maximized by applying probit to a 
data set in which the unit of observation is the claimant-time period
o(rather than the claimant, as in the linear model).
Note that using a set of time-since-initial-claim dummy variables 
allows us to estimate a flexible relationship between the conditional 
reemployment probability and the time since filing the initial claim. No 
assumption is imposed on the shape of the hazard function or the 
distribution of reemployment probabilities. Note also that under this 
specification, each worker in the sample has a reemployment probability 
based on his or her characteristics (xx ,..., XK ), and this probability 
changes during the spell of unemployment according to the season in which he 
or she is searching and the length of time since filing the initial claim. 
The model we estimate shares this feature with the well-known proportional 
hazards model of Cox (1972), and is in fact a discrete version of that model 
(Allison 1984).
The results of estimating four discrete-time hazard models are 
displayed in Table 6, columns (3) through (6). We specify separate models
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for FSC-eligible controls, FSC-eligible experimentals, FSC-ineligible 
controls, and FSC-ineligible experimentals in order to allow the hazard 
function for each group to be estimated without coefficient restrictions. 
Although the hazard functions that derive from these estimates are of 
central interest, we consider first the coefficient estimates of the 
demographic and other variables in the model.
Older workers in all four groups have lower probabilities of 
reemployment in any given period than do younger workers, reflecting greater 
difficulty in matching workers to jobs when workers have more specific human 
capital. Although there is no clear difference between men and women in 
reemployment probabilities, blacks and Hispanics have a significantly lower 
probability of reemployment. This finding is consistent with discrimination 
against blacks in hiring.
Workers who had higher earnings in the base period were somewhat more 
likely to be reemployed quickly. This is consistent with the idea that 
high-wage workers have a higher opportunity cost of remaining unemployed, 
and hence search with greater effort. Once base period earnings are 
controlled for, the weekly UI benefit amount has no important impact on 
reemployment probabilities in these data.
Workers who filed for UI benefits in more favorable labor markets--that 
is, labor markets in which unemployment was low or rapidly falling--had 
significantly higher reemployment probabilities than did workers who were 
searching in slacker labor markets. This is consistent with the model we 
develop below, in which the existence of more job vacancies leads to a 
higher reemployment probability.
13
Finally, there is little evidence of any seasonality in the probability 
of reemployment. Although FSC-eligible controls had a lower reemployment 
probability when searching during the winter than during the summer, no 
other seasonality coefficient has a p-value as low as 5 percent.
The main point of obtaining the hazard estimates in columns (3) through 
(6) of Table 6 is to generate adjusted reemployment hazard functions for 
each of the four groups. The hazard functions implied by the estimates are 
displayed in Table 7. These conditional reemployment probabilities are 
obtained by substituting the mean characteristics of each duration cohort 
into the appropriate model and solving for the expected probability of 
reemployment. For example, the expected reemployment probability for FSC- 
eligible controls during weeks 6 and 7 (0.0434) is obtained by substituting 
the mean characteristics of FSC-eligible controls who were available for 
reemployment at the beginning of weeks 6 and 7 into the control group model 
(Table 6, column (3)), adding the time-since-initial-claim coefficient for 
weeks 6 and 7, and solving.
The most striking feature of Table 7 is the similarity of the adjusted 
hazards shown there to the unadjusted hazards shown in Tables 4 and 5. In 
fact, the patterns are so similar that the discussions of the unadjusted 
hazards that we offered in section I.A.2 apply equally here. Given the 
similarity of the adjusted and unadjusted hazards, it is not surprising that 
the implied expected durations of unemployment shown in the bottom row of 
Table 7 are nearly identical to those shown in Tables 4 and 5. Those 
expected duration estimates suggest a bonus impact of 1.76 weeks (25.86 - 
24.10) for FSC-eligibles, but of only 0.88 week (22.43 - 21.56) for FSC- 
ineligibles. As we discuss in section III, the difference between FSC-
14
eligibles and -ineligibles in their response to the Claimant Bonus (roughly 
0.9 week greater for FSC-eligibles) has a p-value of about 6.5 percent (that 
is, a test for equality of responses would be rejected at the 6.5-percent 
significance level).
II. An Equilibrium Model of the Reemployment Bonus
The evidence suggests that the effect of the Illinois Claimant Bonus 
was greater for FSC-eligible workers (who were eligible for 38 weeks of UI 
benefits) than for FSC-ineligible workers (who were eligible for only 26 
weeks). Our goal in this section is to develop a model that yields insight 
into why this should be true. Recall that the Illinois Claimant Bonus 
offered to pay $500 to recipients of Unemployment Insurance (UI) who found a 
job during the first eleven weeks after filing for UI. These workers were 
also eligible for either 38 or 26 weeks of UI (following a waiting week). 
For the purposes of modeling the bonus program, then, we divide unemployed 
workers into three groups: those offered the bonus and eligible for UI; 
those no longer offered the bonus but still eligible for UI; and those 
neither offered the bonus nor eligible for UI. We first set out a model in 
which bonus-offered workers are eligible for 26 weeks of UI benefits, then 
indicate the straightforward changes that are needed to generate the model 
in which workers are eligible for 38 weeks of UI benefits.
To investigate the impact of the bonus program on the expected duration 
of unemployment, we adopt an equilibrium model in which it takes time and 
effort for firms with vacancies and unemployed workers to find each other 
(thus, unemployment is frictional). Jobless workers can reduce the time it
15
takes to find employment by searching with greater effort, although 
increasing search effort is costly. In conjunction with the assumed 
matching technology, workers' search efforts determine the rate at which new 
jobs are created. To obtain a model with an equilibrium level of 
unemployment, it is necessary to assume that jobs do not last forever. We 
therefore assume that in each period some jobs dissolve, creating 
unemployment. In equilibrium, the rate of job creation and job dissolution 
are equal. Our model therefore combines elements of the job search and 
matching literatures. However, as we describe below, our model differs from 
much of the work on matching by assuming that all firms pay the same wage 
and all workers are equally productive. "
A. The Model
The model is explained in three stages. First, we discuss the steady- 
state conditions, which describe the dynamics of the labor market, including 
the manner in which jobs are created and destroyed. These conditions 
guarantee that the flows into and out of employment are equal (so that we 
have an equilibrium). Second, we develop the matching technology. Third, 
we solve the problem of a typical unemployed worker who must choose search 
effort to maximize expected lifetime utility. To do so, we must first 
derive the expected utility of workers who are employed and the expected 
utility for jobless workers. Search effort is then chosen to maximize the 
expected lifetime income of unemployed workers.
1. Steady State Conditions. Let J denote the steady state number of
16
jobs held in the economy, and V the number of vacancies. Then, by 
definition, F denotes full employment where
(2.1) F = J + V.
We also interpret F as the number of firms in the economy. This is 
equivalent to an assumption that each firm employs at most one worker (i.e., 
there is no distinction between a firm and a vacancy) . This modelling 
abstraction is used to keep the analysis as simple as possible.  *-
We measure time in two-week intervals since, again, insured unemployed 
workers in Illinois are certified for two weeks of UI benefits at a time. 
With this in mind, let L denote the total number of workers in the labor 
force (employed and unemployed); Ut , the number of unemployed workers who 
are in their tth two-week period of search where t < 14 (these workers are 
eligible for state-regular UI benefits); and Un , the number of workers who 
have been unemployed for more than 14 periods (or twenty-eight weeks; i.e., 
they have exhausted their UI benefits) . Then the number of workers eligible
14
for UI at any point in time is £ Ut while Un represents the number of
t=i 
ineligible workers. Since all workers are either employed or unemployed, it
follows that:
14
(2.2) L - J + £ Ut + Un .
t=i
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are simple accounting identities. We now 
turn to a description of the evolution of the labor market over time. 
There are 15 employment states: employment (state J), insured unemployment
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(one state each for Ut with t < 14) and unemployment after UI benefits are 
exhausted (state Un ) . Movements into and out of these states depend on the 
rates at which jobs are found and destroyed. Let mt denote the probability 
that an insured unemployed worker who is in the tth period of search finds 
employment and let n^ play the same role for unemployed workers who have 
exhausted their UI benefits. Note that mt and n^ are reemployment hazards. 
We use a to denote the separation (or "break-up") rate. That is, a 
represents the probability that a job will dissolve during any two-week 
period. The determination of mt , n^ , and a will be discussed in detail 
below but, for now, they will be treated as parameters.
The evolution of the labor market is depicted in Figure 1. Consider 
first the flows into each state of unemployment. In any given period there 
are J employed workers. At the end of the period, oJ of these workers lose 
their jobs and must reenter the search process. The remainder, (l-a)J, 
retain their jobs and remain in state J. Thus, the flow into state Uj^ is 
aJ. Workers enter state Ut (with t < 14) if and only if they were in their 
(t-l) st period of search in the previous period and failed to find a job. 
Thus, the flow into state Ut is (l-m^^Ut...!. Finally, workers exhaust 
their UI benefits if they fail to find employment in their twenty-seventh 
week of search. The flow into Un is therefore equal to (l-m1A )U1/( .
The flows out of each state are even easier to characterize. In each 
period, successful searchers in state Ut find employment and enter state J 
while unsuccessful ones move on to state Ut+1 . Thus, all insured unemployed 
workers flow out of their current state. This implies that the flow out of 
Ut is simply Ut . Unemployed workers who have exhausted their UI benefits
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leave their state only when they find employment. Thus the flow out of Un 
is equal to n^l^ .
In a steady-state equilibrium the flows into and out of each employment 
state must be equal so that the unemployment rate and the composition of the
unemployment pool (i.e., the distribution of Ut ) do not vary over time.
1 9 Equating these flows yields the following steady-state conditions.-^
(2.3)
(2.4) (l-int-i)^ = Ut for t = 2 , . . . , 14
(2.5)
If (2. 3) -(2. 5) hold then J, Ut , and Un will not vary over time.
2. Matching Technology. The reemployment probabilities (or hazards), 
m^ and n^ , depend on the matching process and level of search effort 
expended by unemployed workers. In each period, unemployed workers choose 
their level of search effort to maximize expected lifetime income. This 
search effort determines the probability that the worker contacts a firm and 
applies for a job (search effort may be fruitless) . The firm hires the 
worker at a wage of w if it has a vacancy and if no other applications are
-1 O
made. J If more than one workers applies, the firm chooses randomly among 
all applicants. A worker's reemployment probability therefore depends on 
the probability of contacting a firm, the probability that the contacted 
firm has a vacancy, and the probability of getting the job over all other 
applicants .
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Formally, let pt denote the probability that, in any given period, an 
eligible worker who has been unemployed for t two-week periods contacts a 
firm (pn plays the same role for workers who have exhausted benefits). This 
variable measures search effort since it can be increased only by searching 
with greater effort. The determination of pt is discussed in the next sub 
section; for now, we treat it as a parameter. Once a firm has been 
contacted, the probability that this randomly chosen firm has a vacancy is 
V/F. Finally, if the firm does have a vacancy, the probability of landing 
the job is 1/(N+1) where N denotes the number of other applications made. 
Since each other worker either does or does not apply to the firm in 
question, N is a random variable distributed Poisson with parameter A 
(defined as the average number of applications across firms). Thus, the 
probability that applicant i gets the job, given that N other applications 
have been filed, is:
N=0
The product of these three probabilities yields the reemployment hazard for 
each worker:^
(2.6) mt = (p t /A)(V/F)[l-e-A ] for t = 1,...,14
(2.7) n^ = ( Pn /A)(V/F)[l-e-A ]
with
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(2.8) A = <1/F){£ Pt Ut + PnUn ).
t=i
3. Search Effort. Search effort is chosen to maximize expected 
lifetime income. It is clear from (2.6) and (2.7) that by searching harder 
an unemployed worker can increase the probability of reemployment . Of 
course, there is a cost associated with increased search effort. The 
optimal search effort results from equating the expected marginal benefit 
from an increase in search effort with its marginal cost.
Let Vt denote the expected lifetime income for an insured unemployed 
worker currently in the tth period of search (Vn plays the same role for 
workers who have exhausted benefits). In addition, let~V-e represent the 
expected lifetime income for a worker who is currently employed. Then, if 
we assume that search costs are quadratic, Vt , Vn , and Ve satisfy:
(2.9) Vt - y - cp? + [l/d+OHmJV. + b) + (l-mt )Vt+1 ) for t - 1,...,6
(2.10) Vt = y - cp? + [l/(l+r)]{mtVe + (l-mt )Vt+1 ) for t = 7.....13
(2.11) V 1A = y - cpf, + [l/(l+r)]{m14 Ve + (l-m14 )Vn >
(2.12) Vn = cp2 + [l/(l,+r)]{nin Ve + (l-mn )Vn )
(2.13) Ve = w + [l/d+r)]^ + (l-a)Ve )
where y denotes UI benefits, b represents the bonus paid to workers 
qualified for it, and r is the bi-weekly interest rate. Equation (2.9)
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states that an unemployed worker who was offered the bonus currently 
collects UI benefits (y) and pays out search costs (cp£). With probability 
mt search is successful and the worker receives a bonus of b and begins 
working (so that expected lifetime income increases to Ve ). With 
probability (l-mt ) search is unsuccessful and the worker continues to search 
in the next period (so that expected lifetime income becomes Vt+1 ). These 
last two terras are discounted since they reflect income received in the next 
period. Equation (2.10) is the analogous condition for a worker who is 
still eligible for UI but is no longer offered the bonus while (2.11) is the 
appropriate expression for a worker about to exhaust UI benefits. Note that 
when a worker who is not offered the bonus finds a job no bonus is 
collected. Finally, (2.12) describes the situation faced by a worker who 
has exhausted UI benefits and (2.13) describes expected income for an 
employed worker. For the employed, current income is w but, with 
probability a the worker becomes unemployed and must begin searching for a 
new job (so that expected income drops to V^. With probability (1-a) the 
worker remains employed and continues to earn Ve .
Each unemployed worker chooses p, the contact probability, to maximize 
expected lifetime income.  * Therefore, pt can be interpreted as search 
effort. Maximizing each expression yields the following optimal levels of 
search effort (recall that the m's are functions of the p's through (2.6) 
and (2.7)): 16
(2.14) Pt - {{mt /[2c(l+r)])[Ve + b - Vt+1 ]}* f or t - 1, . . . , 6
(2.15) pt = {{mt /[2c(l+r)]}[Ve - Vt+1 ]p for t = 7,....13
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(2.16) Pl4 - {{m1A /[2c(l+r)]}[Ve - Vn ]>*
(2.17) Pn = {{mn /[2c(l+r)]}[Ve - Vn ]>*
To summarize, in each period unemployed workers choose search effort (as 
measured by pt , the contact probability) to maximize expected lifetime 
income. The optimal values for search effort are given by (2.14)-(2.17). 
These contact probabilities then determine the average number of 
applications filed at each firm (A as given in (2.8)) and the reemployment 
probabilities (as given in (2.6) and (2.7)). Jobs are created as unemployed 
workers find firms with vacancies and production takes place. Finally, at 
the end of the period, a fraction a of all jobs break-up and the newly 
unemployed workers start searching for new jobs. The steady-state 
conditions (2.3)-(2.5) guarantee that the flows into and out of each 
employment state are balanced so that the unemployment rate and the 
composition of the unemployment pool are time invariant.
The model consists of sixty-four equations (one each in (2.1) - (2.3), 
(2.5), (2.7), (2.8), (2.11) - (2.13), (2.16), and (2.17); thirteen in (2.4); 
fourteen in (2.6); six each in (2.9) and (2.14); and seven in (2.10) and 
(2.15)), in sixty-four unknowns (J, V, Ut for t < 14, Un , mt for t < 14, n^ , 
p t for t < 14, pn , A, Vt for t < 14, Vt , and Ve ) and seven parameters (F, L, 
a, c, y, w, and r). Once the model has been solved, the expected duration 
of unemployment (d) can be calculated as:




(2.19) ft = (l-mi)(l-m2 ) ... (1-m^) (mt ) .
Equation (2.19) gives the unconditional probability of experiencing t two- 
week periods of unemployment (calculated as the product of the probabilities 
of not finding a job in each of the first t-1 periods, times n^ , the 
conditional probability of finding a job in period t).
The model can be extended to allow for 38 weeks of UI eligibility by 
letting t run from 1 to 20 in equations (2.2), (2.4), (2.6), (2.8), (2.10), 
and (2.15), and by substituting U20 for U1A in (2.5), (2.11) and (2.16).
B. Impact of the Bonus
To obtain the predicted impact of the Claimant Bonus we solve the model 
for b = 0 and 500, and then compare the implied expected durations of 
unemployment with and without the bonus. We do this for both the model in 
which workers are eligible for 38 weeks of UI benefits and for the model in 
which workers are eligible for 26 weeks of benefits.
1. Calibration and Solution. In order to solve the model, we need 
estimates of the parameters involved. Because full employment (F) and the 
cost parameter (c) are not observable, we proceed in two steps. First, we 
use data from before the Claimant Bonus experiment occurred to infer values 
for F and c. We then fix these values and solve the model with b = 500 to 
determine the impact of the bonus offer.
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To infer values for F and c we adopt the following procedure. First, 
we note that the model is homogeneous of degree zero in F and L. Fixing L 
at 100 and allowing F to vary, we have found that for values of F ranging 
from 99 to 101, the model predicts an equilibrium unemployment rate in the 
range of 5% to 12%, which seems appropriate given the time period in which 
the experiment was conducted. We have carried out the analysis for values 
of F falling in this range and found that our results are robust with 
respect to variations in F (Davidson and Woodbury 1990).
Next, we obtain values for y, w, and d from data gathered to evaluate 
the experiment. We then choose appropriate ranges of values for a and r, 
relying on the literature for guidance. By treating d as a parameter, we 
are able to add equation (2.18) to the model and solve it treating c as 
endogenous. For each pair (a,r), this gives us a value for c that is 
consistent with the data.
The average UI benefit for workers in our sample (for two weeks, and 
including the dependents' allowance) was $280 during the experiment. (The 
figure is virtually the same for all four groups we are considering--FSC- 
eligibles and -ineligibles, controls and experimentals--as can be seen in 
Table 1.) The average earnings (again for two weeks) of workers in our 
sample who gained reemployment was $490. The expected duration of 
unemployment for FSC-eligible controls was 25.86 weeks, and for FSC- 
ineligible controls was 22.43 weeks (Table 7). In all of the results 
reported below, we have set L = F = 100, y = 280, w = 490, and d = 25.86 
(for FSC-eligibles) or d = 22.43 (for FSC-ineligibles). Also, since we must 
start by focusing on the labor market in the absence of the bonus, we set b 
= 0.
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For values of a, the bi-weekly break-up rate, and r, the bi-weekly 
discount rate, we turn to the literature. Papers by Murphy and Topel 
(1987), Ehrenberg (1980) and Clark and Summers (1982) suggest that s for a 
two-week period falls somewhere in the range of .006 to .014 (the mean 
appears to be about .01). We therefore focus on the case s = .01, but also 
show that similar results are obtained when s = 0.006 and 0.014. For r we 
consider values of 0.002, 0.008, and 0.02. This translates into annual 
discount rates ranging from about 5% to 67% and therefore should include 
most relevant values. While the value of c is sometimes sensitive to the 
values chosen for a and r, our overall results concerning expected duration 
of unemployment are remarkably robust.
Calibrating the model in the manner described above allows us to obtain 
values of c for various combinations of a and,r. The next step is to use 
each value of c to examine the impact of the bonus offer. To do so, we 
continue to assume that L = F = 100, y = 280, and w = 490. Now, however, we 
set b   500. We then choose values for s and r and set c accordingly. The 
model can then be solved for all endogenous variables including the expected 
duration of unemployment (d).
2. Results. Solving the model both with and without the bonus offer 
yields the predicted effect of the bonus on the expected duration of 
unemployment. The predicted bonus effects under the values of s and r that 
we have chosen are reported in Table 8. For FSC-eligible workers, we find 
that the model predicts reductions in expected unemployment of between 1.08 
and 1.43 weeks. In contrast, for FSC-ineligible workers, the model predicts 
reductions of only 0.29 to 0.43 week.
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The effect of the Claimant Bonus is larger when potential benefit 
duration is longer for reasons that can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the 
level of search effort predicted by our model for each of the four groups we 
are examining. (The results shown are from models in which s = 0.01, r = 
0.008, and in which we have held search cost equal for all groups so that 
comparing search effort across groups is meaningful.)
Note first that, as expected, search effort is lower for FSC-eligibles 
than for FSC-ineligibles throughout the period of UI eligibility. Second, 
note that the bonus offer immediately increases the search effort of bonus - 
offered workers, because the offer increases the expected return to search. 
The size of the bonus impact is related to the number of-weeks the worker 
has been unemployed, with newly unemployed workers responding less than 
those about to lose their chance to qualify for the bonus. This occurs 
because newly unemployed workers face a longer time horizon over which to 
search and (possibly) qualify for the bonus. As the end of the 
qualification period draws nearer, workers respond with greater search 
effort.
Third, the absolute increase in search effort induced by the bonus 
offer is similar for both FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles, which implies a 
greater proportional increase in the search effort of FSC-eligibles. That 
is, FSC-eligible workers who have a chance to get the bonus increase their 
search intensities relatively more than do bonus-offered FSC-ineligibles. 
It follows that the bonus offer should have a greater impact on workers who 
are eligible for more weeks of UI benefits.
Table 8 showed this greater impact on the expected duration of 
unemployment. Figure 3 shows the impact on reemployment probabilities. The
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figure shows the conditional reemployment probabilities (or hazard 
functions) that the model predicts for each of the four groups. Not 
surprisingly, these hazard functions have shapes that are similar to the 
predicted search effort functions in Figure 2. The main difference is that 
the increase in search effort of bonus-offered workers reduces the 
reemployment probabilities faced by workers not offered the bonus (i.e., the 
"with bonus" lines are below the "without bonus" lines in weeks 12-13 and 
higher). This result occurs for reasons that we have explored in depth 
elsewhere (Davidson and Woodbury 1990).
III. Discussion and Summary
Table 9 summarizes both the empirical and theoretical results from 
sections I and II. The estimates are in general agreement that workers who 
were eligible for 38 weeks of UI benefits (FSC-eligibles) experienced a 
reduction of unemployment (either insured unemployment or expected duration 
of actual unemployment) on the order of 1.75 weeks as a result of the 
Illinois Claimant Bonus. The errors surrounding these estimates suggest a 
substantial range around this point estimate, so that there is at least one 
chance in six that the bonus impact was as great as 2.2 weeks, and an equal 
probability that the impact was as small as 1.3 weeks.
The estimates also agree that the bonus impact on workers who were 
eligible for 26 weeks of UI benefits (FSC-ineligibles) was on the order of 
0.75 weeks. The errors surrounding these estimates are large enough to 
suggest that the impact of the Claimant Bonus on these workers, although 
probably non-zero, could have been very small.
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The difference between the bonus impacts under 38 and 26 weeks of 
benefit entitlement can be seen in Table 9, column 3. The point estimates 
are consistent in showing that the bonus effect for FSC-eligibles exceeded 
that for FSC-ineligibles by close to 1 week. The differences in bonus 
impacts on insured unemployment (1.066 and 1.008 weeks) have p-values of 5 
percent (are statistically significantly different from zero using a 5- 
percent confidence test). However, the differences in bonus impacts on 
expected duration of unemployment (0.879 and 0.885) have p-values of about 
15, suggesting that there is roughly 1 chance in 7 that these differences 
occurred by chance. Although not overwhelming, the evidence seems fairly 
convincing that the impact of the Illinois Claimant Bonus^was greater for 
FSC-eligibles--that is, those who were eligible for an additional 12 weeks 
of benefits.
The bonus impacts predicted by the search/matching model (section II) 
accord remarkable well with the empirical findings, as can also be seen in 
Table 9. The range of predicted bonus impacts for FSC-eligible workers--a 
reduction of between 1.08 and 1.43 weeks in the duration of unemployment--is 
slightly below our empirical point estimates of the bonus impact. But that 
entire range (1.08-1.43) falls within the 5-percent confidence interval 
around any of the four point estimates of the bonus impact on FSC-eligibles. 
Also, those confidence intervals do not overlap any part of the range of 
predictions of the FSC-i.neligible bonus impact (0.29-0.43).
Similarly, the range of predicted bonus impacts for FSC-ineligible 
workers--a reduction of between 0.29 and 0.43 weeks--is below our empirical 
point estimates for FSC-ineligibles. But again the entire range (0.29-0.43) 
falls within the 5-percent confidence interval around any of the four point
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estimates of the FSC-ineligible bonus impact. (These confidence intervals 
do, however, partly overlap the range of predictions of the bonus impact on 
FSC-eligibles (1.08-1.43)).
Finally, column 3 of Table 9 shows that the model predicts a bonus 
impact on FSC-eligibles that is 0.79 to 1.00 week greater than the bonus 
impact on FSC-ineligibles. This range corresponds closely to the range of 
empirical point estimates shown above it in column (3).
In summary, Table 9 suggests that the model developed in section II 
offers predictions that are qualitatively correct and correspond 
quantitatively to the observed impacts of the Claimant Bonus on FSC- 
eligibles and -ineligibles.
The main conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that the 
striking impact of the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment reported in 
Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) is the combination of a whopping bonus effect 
on FSC-eligibles and a rather unremarkable effect on FSC-jLneligibles. That 
is, the overall bonus impact of 1.15 weeks (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987, 
Table 4), is a weighted average of large impacts on workers who were 
eligible for 36 weeks of UI benefits and small impacts on workers who were 
eligible for 26 weeks of benefits. These findings are consistent with the 
search/matching model that we have tailored to the Illinois setting. That 
model predicts a rather small bonus impact for workers eligible for 26 weeks 
of benefits, but predicts a far greater effect for workers eligible for 38 
weeks of benefits.
Why was the effect of the Claimant Bonus experiment so much larger for 
FSC-eligible workers than for workers eligible for only 26 weeks of UI 
benefits? The answer provided by the search/matching model is that FSC-
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eligible workers increased their search efforts disproportionately relative 
to FSC-ineligibles. The logic behind this is twofold. First, FSC-eligibles 
are predicted to have lower search intensities than are FSC-ineligibles 
because they are eligible for more weeks of benefits. Second, the increase 
in search effort that results from the bonus offer has a similar absolute 
magnitude for both FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles. It follows that the 
bonus induces a greater relative increase in the search effort of FSC- 
eligibles , and hence a greater reduction in both insured unemployment and 
the expected duration of actual unemployment.
The results reported here, along with those reported for the Washington 
Reemployment Bonus by Spiegelman, O'Leary, and Kline (1990), suggest that 
the reemployment bonus may be a less promising policy during normal economic 
times in the U.S. than was earlier thought. Nevertheless, the new results 
reported above on the Illinois Bonus suggest a possible role for the 
reemployment bonus during a downturn in the U.S.--that is, in conjunction 
with extended benefits. Moreover, the new results suggest a possible role 
for the reemployment bonus in Canada and Western European countries, where 
workers typically are entitled to 1 year of UI benefits, rather than just 
six months as is standard in the U.S.
The search/matching model developed here, perhaps with some further 
refinements, could be useful in designing an optimal bonus program in any of 
these settings. It would be useful to subject the model to further 
statistical testing--particularly tests of the reemployment hazard 
predictions of the model. But the results presented above seem promising, 
and suggest that this model (or some variant of it) could be an important 




1. Eligibility for FSC was determined when a worker filed the initial 
claim for UI benefits. Once eligible, the worker could receive an 
additional 12 weeks of benefits, and could continue to receive FSC benefits 
even after new claimants were being denied FSC benefits because of the 
program's expiration.
2. The exclusion results in deletion of 246 controls and 260 experimentals 
from the sample.
3. The reemployment indicator is based on both quarterly earnings records 
that are matched to each worker's benefit record, and a special rehire 
indicator constructed by the Illinois Department of Employment Security. We 
have experimented with various methods of combining these two data to get a 
single estimate of the time of reemployment, and find that the results are 
robust to the variations.
4. We lose some information by using discrete two-week time periods. Any 
worker who received an even number of weeks of UI benefits (including zero) 
and gained reemployment in the following week is counted as gaining 
reemployment one week too late. The importance of this information loss is 
lessened by the fact that, as Harris (1987) discovered, only about half as 
many workers in Illinois receive an even number of weeks of benefits as 
receive odd number of weeks, mainly because of the system of certifying for 
two weeks of benefits at a time. We believe that the increased simplicity 
in estimation and modelling (see section II) that results from using two- 
week periods outweighs the information loss that may result.
5. It is also possible that these workers left Illinois, in which case we 
cannot be sure of their labor force status. In either case, treating these 
cases as incomplete or censored spells of joblessness is appropriate.
6. The expected durations in Tables 4, 5, and 7 are obtained by equations 
(2.18) and (2.19) in section II. Standard errors associated with each 
expected duration are estimated by a Taylor approximation that makes use of 
the variances of the hazards. We assume that workers who have exhausted 
benefits have a constant reemployment hazard equal to n^ (the hazard in the 
period following benefit exhaustion) in perpetuity; for example, n^ = 0.3816 
for FSC-eligible controls (Table 4).
7. See Lancaster and Nickell (1980), Ham and Rea (1987), and Lancaster 
(1990) for details.
8. That is, we transform the data in which the claimant is the unit of 
observation in to a data set in which each claimant contributes Ti 
observations, where TA is the number of two-week time periods in which 
claimant i is observed in our data. The dependent variable in the probit is 
zero for each period in which the claimant remained unemployed, and 1 in the 
period in which the claimant became reemployed. (For censored spells-- 
spells in which we never observe reemployment--the dependent variable is
32
zero for all claimant-time periods in which a claimant is observed.) See 
the exposition in Allison (1984).
9. Since these are probit coefficients, a rough idea of the derivative of 
the reemployment probability with respect to an independent variable can be 
obtained by multiplying each coefficient by 0.10, which is the approximate 
value of the standard normal density associated with the mean reemployment 
probabilities in these samples (which range from 0.048 to 0.059).
10. This model is patterned after the "trade frictions" models developed by 
Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984), among others. In 
such models, the number of contacts between workers and firms is determined 
by search effort, a matching (or search) technology, and by equilibrium 
conditions that state that in steady-state the rate of job creation must 
equal the rate at which jobs break-up. Wage rates are determined through 
negotiations once a job contact has been made. In almost all such models, 
job offers are never rejected (see Diamond and Maskin (1979) for a notable 
exception) . The trade frictions approach contrasts with the search approach 
more frequently used in labor economics, in which unemployed workers receive 
job offers that they are free to accept to reject. The offers arrive 
randomly at an average rate, A, and the wage offers come ~~from a stationary 
cumulative distribution function, F(w) . Both A and F(w) are exogenous, so 
that no attempt is made to model the firm's side of the labor market or to 
characterize the full labor market equilibrium. Since only labor supply is 
modelled, such models are commonly referred to as "partial-partial." In the 
partial-partial model, unemployment is tied to the rate of job rejection, 
whereas in the trade frictions approach, unemployment is determined by 
search effort and the matching technology.
Our main reasons for choosing the trade frictions approach are the 
relative ease with which institutional details of the UI system can be 
incorporated into it, and the relative ease with which it can be tested 
empirically. (Atkinson and others (1984) and Atkinson and Micklewright 
(1990) have developed these and other criticisms of the partial-partial 
approach.) Regarding the latter point, difficulties posed by partial- 
partial models (for our purposes) include the severe demands they make on 
our'knowledge of the labor market (for example, knowledge of the wage-offer 
distribution F(w)) and the sensitivity of their quantitative predictions to 
underlying parameters and the wage-offer distribution. (See Marshall and 
Zarkin (1987) for a discussion of the importance of distinguishing the 
unobservable wage-offer distribution from the observable wage distribution.) 
Although in the trade frictions approach, different assumptions about 
underlying parameters (both observable and unobservable) generate different 
quantitative predictions, we show below that it is possible to estimate the 
underlying unobservable parameters, and find that the model's implications 
are quite insensitive to variations in those parameters.
11. Equivalently, we could assume that each firm consists of several job 
opportunities but recruits for and fills each job separately.
12. We assume throughout that the separation rate (a) is not affected by 
the Claimant Bonus program so that it may treated as exogenous.
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13. In Davidson and Woodbury (1990) we allow the firm and worker to 
bargain over the wage so that earnings are determined endogenously. This is 
accomplished by introducing value functions for the firm similar to the 
functions used to describe worker income in section II.A.3 below. We then 
use the Nash Cooperative Bargaining Solution which dictates that the wage be 
set such that the firm and worker split the rents created by the job evenly. 
For all relevant parameters, we show that the program has only a very small 
impact on wages. This result is consistent with the experimental findings 
in Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987). Therefore, treating w as exogenous is a 
costless way to simplify the analysis.
14. This is equivalent to assuming that all job contacts are made by 
workers and that the underlying matching technology is quadratic (Diamond 
and Maskin 1979).
15. If p < 1 then p represents a contact probability. If p > 1 then we 
interpret p as the number of firms contacted by the worker per period. For 
example, if p = 1.5 then we assume that the worker contacts one firm with 
probability 1 and a second firm with probability .5. We ignore the 
possibility that any given worker may contact the same firm twice in any 
given period.
16. In maximizing Vt over pt we treat A as a parameter. The rationale 
is that since each worker is small relative to the market, each individual 
can ignore his/her own effect on A.
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Table 1
Illinois Claimant Bonus Experiment: Participation and Use, 
by Entitlement to UI Benefits
o




Eligible for the 2106 1.00 2337 1.00 
experiments
Agreed to -- -- 1960 0.84 
participate
Submitted -- -- 468 0.20 
notice of hirec
Bonus paid -- -- 368 0.16




Eligible for the 1600 1.00 1589 1.00 
'experiments
Agreed to -- -- 1346 0.85 
participate
Submitted -- -- 239 0.15 
notice of hirec
Bonus paid -- -- 183 0.12
Proportion eligible 0.568 0.595 
for FSC
Notes: a. Eligible for a total of 38 weeks of Unemployment Insurance 




b. Eligible for UI benefits, met the age and initial claim restriction of 
the experiments, and were located in the administrative records of the 
Illinois Department of Employment Security.
c. Includes participants who ultimately received a bonus but did not submit 
a notice of hire when they gained reemployment within 11 weeks of filing 
their UI claim.
d. Eligible for only 26 weeks of state-regular UI benefits. Only workers 
with an earnings history sufficient to make them eligible for FSC, if they 
had filed for UI benefits before FSC expired, are included in this sample.
Table 2
Characteristics of Claimants Assigned to Experimental Group, 
by Entitlement to UI Benefits









Number of employers 
in base period
Base period earnings 3






















































































































N 2106 2337 1600 1589
Table 2 
(continued)
Notes: a. The base period is the first four of the five completed quarters 
before filing for UI benefits.
b. Number of referrals received from the Employment Service office where 
the claimant registered.
c. The weekly benefit amount excludes any dependents' allowance received.
d. Rejection of the hypothesis that the difference of means or proportions 
between the control and experimental groups is zero using a two-tailed 5- 
percent significance test.
e. Rejection of the hypothesis that the difference of means or proportions 
between FSC-eligible controls and FSC-ineligible controls is zero using a 
two-tailed 5-percent significance test.
Table 3
Means and Differences of Means of Program Variables 
by Experimental Group and Entitlement to UI Benefits
FSC-elieibles
Benefits paid ($)







































































































































8)Ended benefits 0.376 





















2106 2337 1600 1589
Table 3 
(continued)
Notes: "First spell" refers to the spell of unemployment immediately following the 
initial claim for UI. "Total benefits paid" refers to the sum of state regular benefits 
and Federal Supplemental Compensation. "Benefit year" refers to benefits paid or weeks 
of benefits paid during the full benefit year for each claimant. "Ended benefits within 
11 weeks" refers to termination of benefits within 11 weeks of filing the initial claim 
(equivalently, 10 or fewer weeks of benefit payments, because of the 1-week waiting 
period). Samples are the same as those underlying Table 2.
a. Rejection of the hypothesis that the difference of means is zero using a two-tailed 
1-percent significance level.
b. Rejection of the hypothesis that the difference of means is zero using a two-tailed 
5-percent significance level.
Table 4
Unadjusted Conditional Reemployment Probabilities (Discrete Hazards), 
FSC-eligibles (38 Weeks of Benefit Entitlement)
Weeks since Control Claimant Experiment























































































































Notes: The risk set is the number of workers unemployed at the start of 
each two-week period. The hazard is the proportion of the risk set who 
gained reemployment during the period. Note that the risk set in each 
successive period does not equal the risk set in the previous period minus 
the number of workers who found reemployment, because of censoring. On 
computation of implied expected durations of unemployment and associated 
standard errors, see footnote 4.
Superscript a denotes rejection of the hypothesis that the difference 
between control and experimental hazards is zero, using a two-tailed 5- 
percent significance test.
Table 5
Unadjusted Conditional Reemployment Probabilities (Discrete Hazards), 
FSC Ineligibles (26 Weeks of Benefit Entitlement)
Weeks since Control Claimant Experiment

























































































Notes: The risk set is the number of workers unemployed at the start 
of each two-week period. The hazard is the proportion of the risk set 
who gained reemployment during the period. Note that the risk set in 
each successive period does not equal the risk set in the previous 
period minus the number of workers who found reemployment, because of 
censoring. On computation of implied expected durations of 
unemployment and associated standard errors, see footnote 4.
Superscript a denotes rejection of the hypothesis that the 
difference between control and experimental hazards is zero, using a 
two-tailed 5-percent significance test.
Table 6
Models of Insured Unemployment Duration and Reemployment Hazard 



































(3) (4) (5) (6)
Discrete reemployment
________Hazard (Maximum Likelihood)_________ 
____FSC-eligibles____ FSC-ineligibles 

































































































































































































































































































































R-squared (adj) 0.076 
Loglikelihood x(-2) 















































Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the number of weeks of insured 
unemployment experienced during the benefit year. The mean of the dependent variable is 
21.7 weeks in column (1) and 18.9 weeks in column (2). Columns (3) through (6) are 
probit estimates of the conditional probability of reemployment in period t. The unit of 
observation is the claimant-certification period. Mean conditional reemployment 
probabilities: 0.048 (column (3)), 0.053 (column (4)), 0.056 (column (5)), 0.059 (column 
(6)).
Table 7 
Adjusted Conditional Reemployment Probabilities (Discrete Hazards)
















































































































probability models reported in Table 6, columns (3) through (6), by 
substituting mean characteristics of each duration cohort of workers into 
the appropriate model and solving for the expected probability of 
reemployment. On computation of implied expected durations of 
unemployment and associated standard errors, see footnote 4.
Table 8
Predicted Impact of the Illinois Claimant Bonus on 
Expected Duration of Unemployment, by Entitlement to UI Benefits
Reduction in expected duration of unemployment (Ad) 
FSC-eligibles FSC-ineligibles
(38 weeks of (26 weeks of 
benefit entitlement) benefit entitlement)
0.002
a - 0.006 1.08 0.29
a = 0.010 1.14 0.32
a = 0.014 1.19 0.35
r = 0.008
a = 0.006 1.15 0.31
a = 0.010 1.20 0.34
a = 0.014 1.25 0.38
r - 0.020
a = 0.006 1.27 0.37
a = 0.010 1.33 0.40
a = 0.014 1.43 0.43
Notes: r = biweekly interest rate; o = separation rate. In the absence of 
the bonus, the expected duration of unemployment is 25.86 weeks for FSC- 
eligibles, and 22.43 weeks for FSC-ineligibles.
Table 9
Summary of Estimated and Predicted Effects of the Illinois Claimant Bonus
under Differing Benefit Entitlements
Reduction in weeks of unemployment 




Comparison of mean 
weeks of insured 
unemployment 
(Table 3)
Expected duration of 
unemployment implied 
by unadjusted hazards 
(Tables 4 and 5)
(1)
FSC-eligibles 





















OLS, duration of insured 1.68 
unemployment (Table 6, (0.400) 
columns 1 and 2)
Expected duration of 1.763 
unemployment implied (0.453) 










Predictions from matching/search model:
From range of values of 





























































Predicted hazard functions 
with and without Claimant Bonus
0.14
0.13
FSC Eligibles without Bonus FSC Eligibles with Bonus










0-1 4-5 8-9 12-13 16-17 20-21 24-25 28-29 32-33 36-37 40+ 
2-3 6-7 10-11 14-15 18-19 22-23 26-27 30-31 34-35 38-39
Weeks since initial claim
